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Mastellone: Payroll Method

EMPLOYEES: SHOW US YOUR PAYCHECK
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 19641 is widely regarded as one
of the landmarks of the civil rights legislation enacted in the
twentieth century. 2 Among the Act's many provisions is Title
VII, considered to be the "most important general statute
regarding employment discrimination." 3 Title VII was the first
Congressional
attempt
to
eliminate
discrimination
in
employment. 4 More specifically, Congressional enactment of
Title VII was aimed at eliminating employment discrimination
"against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges in employment, because of the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Civil
Rights Act was drafted in response to the nationwide persistence of
discrimination against minority groups to eliminate the unfairness and
humiliation of discrimination. See. e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the
Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 645. 671
(1995). The Civil Rights Act addresses discriminatory conduct in several
contexts, with discrimination in employment being the prime focus of Title
VII. See Michael Mankes, Combating Individual Employment Discrimination
in the United States and Great Britain:A Novel Remedial Approach. 16 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 67, 68 (1994) (citing S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 557).
2. Mark A. Azman, The Development of Title VII Protection for
American Citizens Employed Abroad by American Employers: Yesterday.
Today and Tomorrow, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 531, 532-33 (1992)
(commenting that Title VII was designed as a remedial statute to protect people
from the overwhelming evils of discrimination and bigotry permeating
employment).
3. Valerie L. Jacobson, Note, Bringing a Title VII Action: Which Test
Regarding Standing to Sue is the Most Applicable, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 95
(1990).
4. Id. Congress originally designed the statute to correct a long overdue
imbalance within most employment contexts which was responsible for causing
"inconvenience. unfairness and humiliation." Id. at 95-96.
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individual's race, sex, color, religion, and national origin."' 5 In
enacting Title VII, Congress required the removal of all artificial,
arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment which operated
to invidiously discriminate on the basis of the enumerated
6
impermissible classifications, including sex.
Title VII is applicable to any actions of an employer at
any time before and after hiring. 7 However, before a Title VII
claim can be instituted, a requisite minimum number of
employees must exist. 8 Specifically, Title VII requires an
employer to maintain at least fifteen employees in each of the
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or prior year in
order to be subject to Title VII jurisdiction. 9 This provision has
caused confusion among the Circuit Courts of Appeals largely
because of the statute's circular definitions of 'employer' and

of
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Sex discrimination was added to the list
prohibitions by floor amendment. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAw 201 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Francis J. Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 441 (1966)). Title
VII covers discrimination based on these factors only and does not cover
discrimination based on non-citizenship and sexual preference. The Senate's
overwhelming vote to deny federal benefits to same sex married couples is
further illustration of Title VII's exclusion of protection based on sexual
preference. See Eric Schmitt, Senators Reject Both Job-Bias Ban and Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
6. Constance E. Norton, Comment, Legislatures Should Not Have Feared
Title VII Pre-Emiption of California's Temporary Transfer Alternative to
Discriminatory Fetal Protection Policies, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 463,
473-74 (1989).
7. See David R. Mitchell, Comment, Legal Profession: Title VII
Prohibits Ser Discrimination in Partnership Selection, 24 WASHBURN LJ.
419. 421 (1985). "fAin employer [may not] fail or refuse to hire or discharge
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." Id. at n. 10 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). This section provides in pertinent part:
"The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and
any agent of such a person ...... Id.
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10

The problem arises when an employer attempts to

have a claim filed against it dismissed on the jurisdictional

grounds that it does not have the requisite minimum of employees
to fall under Title VII. This defense, however, causes the courts
many problems primarily because Title VII does not specify the
proper method for counting employees.
Until now, federal courts have utilized two divergent
approaches when determining whether there are the requisite
number of employees to satisfy the jurisdictional minimum. The
"payroll method," adopted by the First and Fifth Circuits, as
well as numerous district courts, I1 counts all workers
"maintained on an employer's payroll within a given week,
regardless of whether they were working on every calendar
day." 12 On the other hand, the "counting method," which has
been adopted by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, excludes parttime and hourly workers who are neither physically present at
work nor on paid leave. 13 However, with the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Walters v. Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises, Inc., 14 this split within the circuit has been resolved.
10. Jacobson, supra note 3, at 97 (noting that the statute fails to define the
specific factors which create an employment relationship). In addition, the
definitional provisions of Title VII are silent as to Congressional intent and
this has resulted in numerous courts adopting divergent methods for
determining who is an employee in order to maintain a Title VII action. Id.
11. See Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634-35 (1st Cir.
1983) (concluding that Congress intended a broad interpretation of the term
'employer'); Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir.
1980) (calculating the number of employees by tolling the number of persons
on the payroll for any given day or week); Cohen v. S.U.P.A., Inc., 814 F.
Supp. 251, 254-55 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (determining that case law and legislative
history compel adherence to the payroll method).
12. Elizabeth Mitchell, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
MetropolitanEduc. Enter., Inc., 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 352, 353 (1996).
13. See, e.g., Ost v. West Suburban Travelers Limousine, Inc., 88 F.3d
435, 439 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that a week will not be counted unless the
requisite number of hourly and part-time workers are either on paid leave or
physically present in the workplace); McGraw v. Warren County Oil Co., 707
F.2d 990, 991 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that "part-time workers who did not
work for each day of the work week were [not) 'employees' for that week.").
14. 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997).
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This Comment will first review the two methods of
counting employees for the purposes of obtaining jurisdiction
over claims filed under Title VII and the rationale proffered by
these courts in adopting that particular method. 15 Second, it will
examine the past disagreement among the federal circuits,
demonstrating the need for a clearer definition of who qualifies as
an employee. 16 Finally, this Comment will analyze the Supreme
Court's recent decision proclaiming the payroll method as the
proper approach for determining the number of employees for
Title VII jurisdictional purposes. 17
SEEKING A DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE" IN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUITS
Under Title VII, an employer is defined as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ... . "18
The "calendar year" referred to in the statute is the year in which
the alleged discrimination occurred. 19 In examining which
employees are to be counted when determining whether the
employer has the requisite number of employees, a court must
first interpret what is meant by Title VII's definition of
However, courts have had trouble developing a
employer.
uniform view of this definition, resulting in confusion among the
courts. To make matters worse, Title VII broadly defines an
employee broadly as "an individual employed for an
15. See infra notes 17 - 100 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 101 - 133 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 134 - 156 and accompanying text.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
19. See generally Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 979
(5th Cir. 1980) (arguing that statute of limitations begins to run when the
alleged discrimination occurred). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2). This
section states in pertinent part: "an unlawful employment practice occurs, with
respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally
discriminatory purpose in violation of this subchapter ... when a person
aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or provision of
the system." Id.
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employer." 20

It is this goal of defining who is an employee

which has caused the most controversy and debate in the federal
court system.

Legislative history supports the view that Congress
intended to cover the full range of workers who may be subject to
the harms the statute was designed to prevent, 2 1 unless such
22
workers were excluded by a specific statutory exception.

However, Title VII does not explicitly prescribe a method for
counting employees in determining whether an employer has the
requisite jurisdictional minimum. As a consequence, courts have
been left to their own devices when making this determination.

20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) states, in pertinent part: "[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer... to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees... because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
22. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) ("the term 'employee' shall not
include any person elected to public office in any State... or any person
chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee
on the policy making level, or an immediate advisor. . . . "); 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(b) (entities not considered to be employers are the "United States. a
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian
tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia... [ori a bona
fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)... "); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)-(i) (specifying that the following shall not be deemed
unlawful employment practices: hiring, classifying or referring for
employment, individuals on the basis of gender, religion, or national origin
where such characteristics are a "bona fide occupational qualification";
employing individuals of a particular religion to work in an educational
institution that is "owned, supported, controlled, or managed" by a religion or
religious group; taking appropriate action against a member of the Communist
Party or a Communist organization pursuant to the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950; refusing to employ or to continue to employ any
individual whose employment would compromise the national security of the
United States; discriminating among employees based upon "a bona fide
seniority or merit system," the quality or quantity of work performed, or a
"professionally developed ability test" that is non-discriminatory in nature;
differentiating between male and female employees with regard to wages
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); and extending preferential treatment to Native
Americans living "on or near a reservation.").
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As a result, two different methods have emerged from case
law. 23
The 'payroll method' looks to the number of employees
24 If
maintained on an employer's payroll within a given week.
the employer has at least fifteen employees on the payroll for
twenty weeks within the calendar year, the jurisdictional
minimum is satisfied regardless of whether or not every employee
on the payroll is working full time or shows up for work every
25
day of the calendar week.
In the alternative, the 'counting method' includes all
"salaried employees toward the minimum, but only considers
employees on days when they are physically present at work or
are on paid leave.,, 26 The central rationale offered by the courts
using this approach is that this method is most consistent with a
plain reading of the language of the statute. 27 Consequently,
courts using the 'counting method,' including the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits, have adopted a narrower definition of
Iemployee" through the exclusion of hourly and part-time
workers who are not physically present or who are on paid
leave.28

23. Compare Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634-35 (1st
Cir. 1983) (holding that an employee is to be counted for each day that an
employment relationship exists regardless of whether that employee was not
physically present on work on a given day in the work week), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 904 (1984) with Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Garden
and Assoc., Ltd., 956 F.2d 842, 843 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that employees
must either be physically present at work or "be on paid leave each day of the
work week in order to be counted" as employees for that week).
24. See generally Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974 (5th
Cir. 1980).
25. Mitchell, supra note 12. at 353.
26. Id. Courts utilizing this method have found that, in keeping with the
statute's most natural interpretation, the phrase "'for each working day' looks
to the number of employees physically at work each day of the week." Id. at
354.
27. Id.
28. Note, Employment Discrimination-Title VII-Seventh Circuit Reaffirms
a Narrow Definition of 'Employer'for the Purposesof Title VII, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 675, 675 (1996).
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A. The Counting Method: The Federal Courts' Decisions in
Zimmerman and Metropolitan.
29
In Zimmerman v. North American Signal Company, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected
the previously established payroll method and adopted the
Though Zinmzerman involved a claim
counting method. 30
31
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
[hereinafter "ADEA"], the Seventh Circuit examined the
statutory language of the ADEA by focusing on a provision
similar to Title VII, which requires an employer to have a
requisite number of employees for each working day of a week
before that week can be counted toward the jurisdictional
minimum. 32 The court noted that "[tihe legislative history of the
nearly identical definitional provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, militates against the distorting traditional
33
concepts of employment relationships."
Sam Zimmerman sued North American Signal Company
[hereinafter "North American"] claiming unlawful age
discrimination in violation of the ADEA. 34 North American
argued that salaried workers should be "counted as employees for
every day of the week they are on the payroll. whether or not
they were actually at work on a particular day." 35 For each day

29. 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983).
30. Id. at 352-54.
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994). The purpose behind the ADEA is to

prevent an employer from discriminating against any person regarding hiring,
discharging, compensation, privileges, or terms and conditions of employment
based upon that person's age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
32. Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 352. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). Section
630(b) states in pertinent part: "[t]he term 'employer' means a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year . . . " Id.

33. Zinunenran. 704 F.2d at 352 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 349.
35. Id. at 353. Thus, an hourly paid worker would not be counted for a
particular work week if he or she were not physically present in the workplace,
regardless of whether or not he or she returned on the next working day. Id.
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of the work week, North American counted its employees
utilizing the counting method. Alternatively, Zimmerman would
add together all salaried and hourly paid employees that were
36
either present at work or on paid leave during the work week.
Thus, if the court adopted the counting method, North American
would not meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII. On
the other hand. if the court adopted Zimmerman's payroll
method, North American would enough employees to subject it
to Title VII jurisdiction.
Finding no way to reconcile the phrase "for each working
day" with the payroll method, the Seventh Circuit held that the
proper method should exclude hourly paid workers on days when
they were neither working nor on paid leave. 37 In adapting the
counting method, the court looked to the Congressional intent
behind the ADEA and determined that the term 'employer' was
38
intended to have its common everyday dictionary usage.
Accordingly, the court felt that "employer" is correctly
interpreted to count employees for each day when they are at
work.

39

In addition, the Zimmerman court insisted that the
"court's interpretation of the term 'employer' cannot contradict
the statutory definition." 40 According to the court, adopting the
payroll method and counting hourly or part time workers as if
they are on the weekly payroll, even if they were not at work
each work day, "would render the phrase 'for each working day'

36. Id. Zimmerman focused on the nature of the employment relationship
and not the number of hours or days worked by an employee.
37. Id.
38. Id.at 352 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (April 8, 1964) which states
in pertinent part: "[tihe term 'employer' is intended to have its common
dictionary meaning, except as qualified by the act.").
39. Id. at 353.
40. Id. at 352-53. It is well established that "a court should not construe a
statute in any way that makes words or phrases meaningless, redundant, or
superfluous." Id. at 353 (citing Conway County Farmers Assoc. v. United
States, 588 F.2d 592, 598 (8th Cir. 1978)).
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meaningless." 4 1 To conclude otherwise would be "contrary to
the explicit definitional restriction chosen by Congress. "42
Furthermore, the Zimnerman court made a distinction

between hourly and salary employees, 43 noting that a
presumption that a salaried employee works every day of the
working week may be appropriate, the specific language of Title
VII does not necessarily lend support such a reading. 44 The
Seventh Circuit stated that "Congress could have exempted
certain small employers from the Act's coverage," 4 5 and,
therefore, if Congress wanted to define the jurisdictional
minimum in terms of a number of employees on a payroll each
week, it certainly could have done so in plain terms.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. 46 is most illustrative
of the Seventh Circuit's continued adoption of the counting
method.

In Metropolitan, the Seventh Circuit was invited to

revisit its decision in Zimnernan. In Metropolitan, the plaintiff
launched a barrage of arguments against the Zimmerman
methodology. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
[hereinafter "EEOC"] brought an action alleging that
Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. [hereinafter
"Metropolitan"] had fired Darlene Walters in retaliation for filing
a gender discrimination charge. The Plaintiff contended that by
enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act, 47 [hereinafter
41. Id. ("The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is remedial in
nature and should be given liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the
purpose of the Act.... [s]uch a liberal construction should be extended to the
definition of employer.").
42. Id.
43. Id. at 353.
44. Id. at 354.
45. Id. (stating that Congress could have accomplished this exemption -by
defining the jurisdictional minimum in terms of the number of employees on
the payroll each week, the number of hours worked by each employee each
week, the number of full-time employee-hours worked each week, or by any
other variation.").
46. 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. granted. 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (1993 & Supp. V 1993). The FMLA
defines employers as "any person engaged in commerce or in an industry or
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"FMLA"], Congress endorsed the payroll method over the
counting alternative used in Zimmerman in a manner that
demanded deference from this court. 4 8 Plaintiff argued that the
recent passage of the FMLA was a "significant development of
the law on the proper interpretation of the statutory definition of
'employer' contained in Title VII," and, therefore, "it is not
necessary that every employee actually perform work on each
49
working day. "
Plaintiff attempted to reinforce this claim by relying on
the congressional commentary pertaining to the FMLA. 50
Plaintiff urged the court to re-examine Zimmerman's holding, as
most courts and the EEOC have interpreted the phrase
.employees for each working day' to mean "employ" in the sense
of maintain on the payroll. 5 1 Finally, Plaintiff argued that the
adoption of the payroll method "comports better with public
In
policy considerations" and is simpler to implement. 5 2
rejecting the plaintiff's arguments, the Seventh Circuit echoed its
prior ruling in Zimmerman by noting that "had Congress truly
intended to enact the payroll method into law, it certainly could
53
have done so in clear and unambiguous terms."
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's
argument that Congress had endorsed the payroll method over the
counting method for purposes of the FMLA. According to the
FMLA, "a part-time or full time employee whose name is
included on an employer's payroll is considered to be employed
on each working day of the calendar week and must be counted"
activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each

working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or
preceding calendar year."
48. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1228.
49. Id.
50. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 354-55. See S. Rep. No. 3, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 21-22 (1993), reprinted 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.
51. Metropolitan. 60 F.3d at 1225.
52. Id. at 1230.
53. Id. at 1229. The court concluded that "Congress chose not to respond

to these concerns in enacting the FMLA ....

[because] if indeed Congress

intended to wished to resolve the Circuit conflict in a particular direction, this
was 'a strange way to make a change."' Id. (citations omitted).
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regardless of whether or not they were physically present at
work. 54 The Act also requires that an employee who is out on
paid or unpaid leave be counted as long as the employer has a
reasonable expectation that the employee will later return to
active employment. 55 Instead of adopting the aforementioned
FMLA's interpretation, the Metropolitan court observed that
"this purported legal milestone of counting employees occurred
not within the text of the statute, but within the legislative
56
history, which has no force of law."
Plaintiff also argued that if Zimmerman was not
overturned, employers will continue to evade "anti-discrimination
legislation simply by structuring" their workplace to escape "the
jurisdictional minimum present on each working day" in order to
avoid potential liability. 57 The court rejected this theory and
pointed out that in the decade since Zimmerman was decided,
there have been conspicuously few participants in the parade of
employers who have purposely structured their workplace in a
manner designed to avoid the jurisdictional minimum required for
Title VII. 5 8 Likewise, the court rejected the argument that the
adoption of the alternative payroll method would afford
simplicity by stating "simplicity alone is simply not sufficient to
override settled statutory interpretation and Circuit precedent."59
Although the Seventh Circuit recognized that many circuit and
district courts have rejected this analysis, the court did not find a
60
compelling reason to overturn precedent.
The court noted that, although Zimmerman involved a
claim brought under the ADEA as opposed to Title VII. the
54. Mark Strength, An Overview of the Application of the Fanilv and

Medical Leave Act of 1993 to Employees of Private Employers. 54 ALA. L.
Rev. 390, 391 (1993).

55. See supra note 48
56. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1228. The court cited the District of

Columbia Circuit, which stated that "[a] Congressional report, even a
conference report is not legislation ...and it does not change the law." Id. at
1229 (quoting In re North, 50 F.3d 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
57. Id.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1997], Art. 10

552

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

analysis was the same, and as such, was dispositive in this
case. 6 1 The court strongly insisted that "compelling reasons are

required to overturn Circuit precedent" and that stare decisis "has
even greater force when the precedent in question involves
statutory construction." ' 62 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
reaffirmed Zimmerman. 63
Judge Ripple, in his concurrence, questioned the

correctness of Zimmerman, but noted that the doctrines of stare
decisis and precedent are especially difficult to overcome when
64
the court deals with matters of statutory interpretation.

Moreover, although obligation to abide by precedent is not
absolute, contrary decisions of other circuit courts did not cast a
significant shadow over Zimmerman as to warrant overruling that
decision.65 Judge Ripple concluded with a plea for legislative

61. Id.
62. Id. at 1228. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164.
172 (1989) (stating that "[wie have said that the burden borne by the party
advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the
Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construction"). Additionally, the
court noted that numerous courts have adopted the Zimmerman approach. See,
e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Garden and Assoc. Ltd.,
956 F.2d 842, 843 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding workers "must either work or be
on paid leave each day of the work week to be counted as an employee for that
week under 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b)."); Richardson v. Bedford Place Housing
Phase I Assoc., 855 F. Supp. 366, 370 (N.D.Ga. 1994) (holding an employee
is counted only in the weeks in which he/she worked every day of the work
week); Lord v. Casco Bay Weekly, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 32, 34 (D.Me. 1992)
(holding "only those part-time hourly paid employees who worked each day of
the week are to be included when counting the number of employee's [in a
given] week.").
63. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1228. The court was of the belief that
"[wihile we afford deference to legitimate agency interpretations of statutory
language made before we have ruled on an issue, the converse is not true: the
judiciary, not administrative agencies, is the final arbiter of statutory
construction." Id. at 1229-30.
64. Id. at 1230 (Ripple, J., concurring).
65. Id. (Ripple, J., concurring). "Upon examination of the case law to the
contrary, however, I cannot say that those cases cast a shadow on Zimmerman
as to justify its overruling." Id. (Ripple, J., concurring).
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action establishing a uniform method for counting employees
under Title VII.66
Having failed to find a compelling reason to override the
statutory interpretation in Zinunermo.n, the Seventh Circuit, in
Metropolitan, held that despite the FMLA's endorsement of the
payroll method, the appropriate method for counting employees
to determine whether the a company is an "employer" under Title
VII is to count hourly or part-time workers as employees only on
67
days when the are physically present at work.

While acknowledging that the statute could have been
drafted more clearly, the court believed that Zimmerman's
interpretation of its plain text has "stood the test of time and a
new set of appellate eyes." 6 8 Furthermore, the court felt that
"judicial construction of the plain language of a statute ends the
matter conclusively: 'the law is clear that when a court can glean
the meaning of a statute from its text, it should look no
further.'"69

B. The PayrollMethod. A Broad Interpretationof "Employee."
In comparison, the payroll method, which has been
adopted by numerous circuit and district courts. 70 uses a more
liberal reading of 'employee' than those courts who have utilized
66. Id. (Ripple, J., concurring) ("This issue is one, however, that deserves
definitive legislative attention ....
ought to be clarified.").
67. Id. at 1228.
68. Id.

[tihe ambiguity of the present situation

69. Id. (citing United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2252 (1995)).
70. See, e.g., Gorman v. No. Pittsburgh Oral Surgery Assoc.. Ltd.. 664
F. Supp. 212 (W.D.Penn. 1987) (holding that the payroll method clearly

effectuates the goals and spirit of the Age Discrimination and Employment
Act); Vera-Lozano v. International Broadcasting, 50 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 1995)

(stating that the most persuasive evidence when determining the jurisdictional
minimum for Title VII is the ongoing employment relationship between the
employee and the employer, not merely counting the number of employees
physically present at work on a given workday).
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the counting method. Under this more expansive method, the
court looks at the number of employees maintained on an
employer's payroll within a given week: if the number is at least
fifteen for twenty calendar weeks, the jurisdictional minimum is
satisfied, regardless of whether or not every employee on the
71
payroll shows up for work every day of the calendar year.
This method of determining who is an 'employer' for purpose of
Title VII has been argued as being easier to enforce in the
everyday workplace. 72 Moreover, proponents of the payroll
method argue that the payroll method would not render the clause
'for each working day' in the "employer" definition
"meaningless, redundant, or superfluous."
The First Circuit's decision in Thurber v. Jack Reilly's,
73
Inc. is most illustrative of the payroll method. In that case, an
employee filed a sex discrimination suit which lead to a dispute
regarding the definition of 'employer' under Title VII. 74 The
Thurber court rejected the employer's argument "that the
insertion of the words 'for each working day' in the statute
necessarily imports a Congressional intent to restrict application
of the statute to employers who had 15 or more employees
actually at work on each working day in each of the 20 or more
calendar weeks." 75 The Thurber court, in agreeing with the
plaintiff, relied on the legislative history of the statute and, in
particular, the comments made by Senator Dirksen, a principle
co-sponsor of Title VII. 7 6 Senator Dirksen stated that because
the definition of 'employer' was borrowed from Title VII, the
Unemployment Compensation Act's 77 definition of 'employee'
71. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 353.
72. Metropolitan, 60 F.3d at 1230.

73. 717 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984). In
Thurber, a female waitress sued her former employer, alleging gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute. Id.
74. Id. at 634.
75. Id.
76. Id.

77. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1954). The Unemployment Compensation Act
primarily grants unemployment assistance of lost wages to individuals during
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must be inferred to mean that each employee would be counted
towards the jurisdictional minimum on days in which an
employment relationship exists, regardless of whether the
employee was physically present at work each day. 7 8 In reaching
its conclusions, the Thurber court reasoned that since the
Unemployment Compensation Act counted each day an
employment relationship existed and since Title VII is to be
consistently construed with its remedial purpose, then this
definition of employee is most appropriate for the analysis of this
case.

79

The Thurber court also cited district court opinions which
relied on statements made in the congressional debate that "'the
term 'employer' is intended to have its common dictionary
meaning' and that employers with part-time or seasonal staffs
were intended to be covered by the act 'when the number of
employees exceeds the minimum figure.'"80 The court looked to
the 1972 debate regarding the reduction of the jurisdictional
number of employees from twenty-five to fifteen and focused on
the arguments that this reduction would surely lead to more
employers being exempt from Title VII coverage, thereby
reducing the number of discrimination claims and possible future
reductions in court calendars. 81 The court stated that, while the
number of employees was a compromise, there was no indication
that Congress intended to impose a requirement that employees
82
must report to work on each day in order to be included.

periods when they become involuntary unemployed through no fault to their
own.
78. Thurber, 717 F.2d at 634.

79. Id. at 634-35.
80. Pedreya v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936. 941
(D. Colo. 1979) (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7216-17 (1964)). See also Hornick
v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (M.D.Pa. 1980) (quoting
Pedreya. 465 F. Supp. at 941).
81. Richardson v. Bedford Place Housing Phase I Assoc.. 855 F. Supp.
366, 370-71 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
82. Thurber, 717 F.2d at 635 (citing 92nd Cong.. 1st Sess..
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1972, pp. 2513-2519).
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In addition, several district courts lend support to the
payroll method. In Hornick v. Borough of Duryea,83 the District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that part-time
school crossing guards are to be counted as employees, even
though they only work a few hours each day of the week. 84 In
reaching this determination, the court noted that "the schoolcrossing guards were hired, controlled, and paid by the
Borough. "' 85 Furthermore, the Borough maintained enough fulltime employees to be subject to Title VII jurisdiction. The court
found that in keeping with the remedial nature of Title VII and a
broad interpretation of 'employer,' "the Borough was

. . .

subject

86
to the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII."
The District Court for the Northern District of New York
also supports the payroll method. 87 Due to the fact that the
Second Circuit has not adopted either the counting or payroll
method, the court in Cohen v. S.U.P.A., Inc. 88 was left to
determine the proper method of counting employees for an age
discrimination suit. In reaching a determination, the court,
analyzed previous case law and interpreted the provisions of Title
VII and concluded that claims brought under the ADEA were to
have a similar interpretation of the word 'employer' when dealing
with the jurisdictional requirements for coverage. 89 Thereafter,

83. 507 F. Supp. 1091 (M.D.Pa. 1980).
84. Id. at 1098. A female police officer sued her former employer
charging that she was a victim of sexual discrimination in employment during
her tenure as a temporary member of the Borough's police department. Id. at
1093.
85. Id. at 1098.
86. Id.
87. See Cohen v. S.U.P.A., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
88. Id. In Cohen, a wholesale liquor salesman filed an Age Discrimination
in Employment Act suit against his former employer charging unlawful
termination due to his age. Id. at 253. Plaintiff charged that two college
students were hired to replace him because they would not need the extended
health insurance benefits that he required. Id.
89. Id. The court stated that "since Congress patterned the ADEA after
Title VII, and courts construing Title VII have counted part-time employees
regardless of whether the employee reported to work each day, then part-time
employees are counted to fulfill the jurisdictional requirement of the ADEA."
Id. at 256.
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the Cohen court held that the proper method of counting
employees is to "examine the numbers of employees on the
payroll of a business over a twenty week period, and not the
90
number of employees who happen to work on any given day."
These district courts maintain that, by employing a liberal
construction of 'employer,' Congress' "purpose of eliminating
inconvenience, unfairness and humiliation of discrimination"
Lending support to this
would surely be achieved. 9 1
interpretation, it has been consistently asserted that, because
"Title VII is remedial in nature, [it] should be given the broadest
interpretation consistent with [this] purpose." 92 For example, the
Hornick court adopted this rationale because both the remedial
nature of Title VII and constantly changing work environments
provide a sufficient basis to hold that an employee must not work
every day of the week in order to be counted as a full-time
93
employee under Title VII.
In Dunas v. Town of Mount Vernon, Alabama,94 an
African-American women charged an Alabama town. town
officials and county personnel board with employment
discrimination on the basis of race. 95 The Fifth Circuit found it
unnecessary to define the meaning of Title VII § 2000e (b)
because it found that even if part-time workers were counted, the
threshold of fifteen required in the statute would not have been
However, in dicta, the court referred to an
reached. 9 6
employment discrimination law treatise which states that "one
looks to each of the 'working days' within the calendar weeks
reviewed to see whether there were fifteen or more individuals
who were on the payroll, regardless of whether they were
actually full time or on any particular day." 97 This treatise was
90. Id. at 255.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Hornick, 507 F. Supp. at 1098.
Id.
Id.
612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 976.
Id. at 979.
Id. at 979-80 n.7 (quoting B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment

DiscriminationLaw, 837-38 (1976)).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

17

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1997], Art. 10

558

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

also relied on in Pascutoi v. Washburn-McReavy Mortuary.98 In

Pascutoi, the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota held that part-time workers could be counted as

employees even though they did not work every working day in
the calendar week since they has been on the defendant's payroll
for the requisite number of weeks. 99 The rationale in Pascutoi is
sound in keeping with congressional intent. 100

II.

TIME FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO SELECT
A METHOD

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Walters v.
Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.,101 recognizing the
imminent need to settle the split in the federal circuit courts on
the method used for counting employees to obtain Title VII

jurisdiction.
1996 from
Employment
Metropolitan
whether the

The Court heard oral arguments on November 6,
petitioners Darlene Walters and the Equal
Opportunity Commission, and respondent,
Educational Enterprises, Inc., on the issue of
construction of Title VII's language "for each

working day" should be interpreted to include workers who are

98. 1975 WL 3615, *2 (D.Minn. July 2, 1975). A female mortician
brought a sex discrimination in employment suit against former employer
charging that she was denied employment opportunities given to male
morticians solely due to her sex. Id. at *1.
99. Id. at *2.
100. Id. (stating that "[t]his Court finds that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Equal Employment Act of 1972 are remedial in nature and should be
given the broadest interpretation consistent with their benevolent purpose").
Id.
101. 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996). Petitioner Darlene Walters and the EEOC
appealed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that "hourly and part-time workers
are to be counted as Title VII employees only on the days they are physically
present at work or on paid leave." Brief for Petitioner Darlene Walters at 14,
Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996) (Nos. 95259, 95-779).
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on an employer's payroll or count only those workers that are
physically present in the workplace or on paid leave. 102
The attorneys for petitioners argued that the Supreme
Court must overturn the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the
Title VII as including only those employees who are physically at
work working for their employer or on paid leave. 103 The heart
of the controversy involved the second step.
Petitioners
contended that the payroll method of counting employees is not
only the more "rational method of determining jurisdiction" 104
but that it is also "consistent with the text, legislative history and
underlying public policy of Title VII and with sound judicial
policy." 105

Petitioners claimed that the counting method utilized by
the Seventh Circuit was erroneous for several reasons. First,
they claimed that, by looking at the language of the statute itself,
it is clear that Congress focused on the ongoing employment
relationship. 106 Accordingly, an employer would come within
the purview of Title VII when he or she has an ongoing
employment relationship with an employer who had "15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks. "' 10 7 Petitioners also focused on the verb -has" in the
language of the statute. 108 They argued that, by using this verb,
Congress intended "the number of employees an employer 'has'
at a particular time, for purposes of Title VII, is thus the number
of employees who are in an employment relationship with the
employer at that time." 10 9 More importantly, in evaluating its
102. Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., Nos. 95-259, 95-779,
1996 WL 656480, at *4 (U.S. Oral Arg. Nov. 6. 1996).
103. Id.

104. Petitioner Walters' Brief at 20, Waiters (Nos. 95-259. 95-779).
105. Id.
106. Walters, 1996 WL 656480, at *5.
107. Id.at *17.

108. Brief for Petitioner Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at
13, Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996) (Nos.

95-779, 95-259).
109. Id. at 13-14. The EEOC looked to the plain dictionary reading of the
verb "have." Id.at 13. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines
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own cases, the EEOC counts both salaried and hourly workers if
they are on an employer's payroll in a given week. 110 The
Commission views "[t]he payroll [a]s a reliable indicator of those
individuals who have an employment relationship with the
employer." 111
Petitioner's second argument was that, contrary to the
decision of the Seventh Circuit in Metropolitan, interpreting and
applying the phrase "for each working day" to the payroll method
does not render that phrase meaningless. 112 They claimed that
reading the phrase in connection with the payroll method gives
the phrase applicability to practical and recurrent situations in the
workplace. 113 In oral argument, attorney's for the EEOC gave
the following example to the Court:
A [retail] business employs

. .

. 25 people. It's open 5 days a

week [in] downtown Washington, DC [and] Business is good.
The owner decides he wants to open on Saturdays. But because
it's downtown, what he does is he asks half the employees to
come in on Saturday one week, and the other half to come in on
the other Saturday.
Under the Seventh Circuit test, that
business, thereby, ipso facto, removes itself from the coverage

after Title VII. Because on the sixth working day, there are not
15 hourly employees present. 114

Petitioners further argued that if the Court chose to adopt
the counting method, "an employee who leaves employment on a
Thursday is not a Title VII employee 'for each working day' of
that week, having been employed for only four of the five days

"have" to mean "to stand in any of several personal relationships to." See
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

1039 (3d ed. 1986).

110. Id. at 14.
111. id.
112. Walters, 1996 WL 656480, at *5.

113. Petitioner Walters' Brief at 22, Walters (Nos. 95-259, 95-779).
Furthermore. petitioner contended that the counting method is "cumbersome,
expensive and time-consuming" and the further adoption of the Zimmerman
method of counting employees would "truly [be] a morass." Reply Brief for
Petitioner Darlene Walters at 1, Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996) (Nos. 95-259, 95-779).
114. Walters, 1996 WL 656480, at *19-20.
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of that week, not including Friday." 115 Petitioners pointed out
that, in the ever-changing world of business, employees tend to
enter and exit the workplace in midweek. 116 Thus, they
concluded, it would be inequitable for the employee who leaves
midweek to be unable to obtain jurisdiction over his or her
former employer under Title VII, regardless of the prior
employment relationship. 117
Finally, the petitioner's contended that the legislative
history and policy underlying Title VII lends support to the
interpretation that the words of the statute favor the inclusion of
part-time and seasonal workers. 118 Title VII is a civil rights
statute enacted to combat discrimination in the workplace and, as
such, should be read broadly and in a way that comports with its
remedial nature. 119 Petitioners noted that according to Senator
Humphrey, a co-sponsor of Title VII, Congress amended the
definition of employer "to provide needed certainty as to
coverage of employers where the number of employees fluctuates
above and below the figure requisite to application of the
title." 120
In response, the Court voiced their concern about how the
payroll method would be implemented in counting seasonal
workers. Specifically, the Court was interested in how the
petitioners would find an on-going employment relationship
where a worker would only be employed for certain months and
would be absent for the rest of the year. 121 Petitioners responded
that if the particular employee has "no expectation of coming
back" to his seasonal employment, that worker would not be

115. Petitioner Walters' Brief at 22-23, Waiters (Nos. 95-259, 95-779).
116. Id. at 23. Petitioner further explained, "[ilt is surely customary that
employees begin and end their employment at the beginning and end of payroll
period, which, for example, are often pegged to the first and last day of a
month .... [which] do not always fall on Monday and Friday." Id.
117. Id.
118. Walters, 1996 WL 656480, at *5.

119. Petitioner EEOC's Brief at 15, Waiters (Nos. 95-259, 95-779).
120. Id. at 28 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 12, 722 (1964)).
121. Waiters, 1996 WL 656480, at *26.
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counted towards the jurisdictional minimum even though he may
remain on the employer's payroll. 122
Contrary to petitioners' arguments, the respondent,
Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., argued that the
Seventh Circuit's decision to maintain the counting method was
correct and should not be reversed by the Court. 12 3 Metropolitan
looked to the vagueness of the language in Title VII as an
implicit implication by Congress that it did not intend to subject
all employers to the regulation of the statute. 124 In addition,
respondent tried to convince the Court that neither the legislative
history nor the prior administrative or agency statutes support the
petitioners' position. 125 Furthermore, unlike the FMLA and the
Unemployment Compensation Act, there are no Congressional
Committee Reports or any indication in the legislative history of
Title VII that Congress intended the payroll method be
adopted.126 According to respondent, these are precisely the
sources in which the Court has historically looked to for
establishing precedent. 127 While the respondents conceded that
Congress borrowed the twenty week concept from the
Unemployment Compensation Act, they urged the Court look to
"the language in the Unemployment Compensation Act [which] is
markedly different from the language that ultimately found its
way into Title VII."128
122. Id. at *27. Attorney for Petitioner EEOC explained that if an employer
chose to run his business by using employees who come irregularly and have
no intent on returning to employment "it would be wrong to impose upon
them the scrutiny of Title VII." Id. at 28.
123. Id. at *17.
124. Id. at *36.
125. Id.
126. Brief for Respondent Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. at 19,
Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996) (No. 95779, 95-259). "The phrase. 'for each working day,' is nowhere specifically
discussed ...

in connection with the legislative history of Title VII." Walters,

1996 WL 656480, at *36.
127. Id.

128. Id. at *33. Furthermore, respondents argued that, for purposes of
Title VII, Congress added the phrases "for each working day" and "in each of
the twenty or more calendar weeks," both of which are conspicuously absent
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The Court challenged Metropolitan's argument regarding
Congress's recent passage of the Family and Medical Leave
Act. 12 9 In enacting the FMLA, Congress used identical language
to Title VII and has chosen to adopt the payroll method. 13 0 It
appeared strange and troublesome to the Court that one might end
up with the payroll method being used under the FMLA, the
ADEA and the Unemployment Compensation Act and a different
method under Title VII. 131 Specifically, the Court asked:
[There is at least some legislative history that some people
might read that seems very heavily to support the-what has been
called the payroll method in connection with the Family Leave
Act? I mean there's a bank for Title VII. We don't know why
they wrote those words. But for the Family and Medical Leave
13 2
Act, we do have legislative history don't we?

In response, respondent pointed out that, even though
Congressional intent for employing the payroll method for
purposes of the FMLA was clear, it does not mean that the Court
must use that decision as a "reliable indicator of what Congress
133
intended when it enacted Title VII thirty years earlier."
After hearing oral arguments from both sides, the
Supreme Court was left to make its decision on which method to
adopt when looking to obtain jurisdiction for purposes of Title
VII. For employees, the payroll method is the most preferable
method because it both maintains the internal consistency of Title
VII and adequately protects all workers from discrimination.
in the Unemployment Compensation Act. Respondent's Brief at 25. Waiters
(Nos. 95-259, 95-779).
129. Walters, 1996 WL 656480, at *33.
130. Id. For purposes of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
Congress included precisely the same 'for each working day' language as Title

VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (4) (A) (i)(Supp. V 1993). More importantly,
House and Senate Committee Reports indicate that Congress clearly intended

that phrase to "mean 'employ' in the sense of maintain on the payroll."
Respondent's Brief at 44, Walters (Nos. 95-259, 95-779).
131. Walters, 1996 WL 656480, at *34.
132. Id. at *35.
133. Respondent's Brief at 31, Waiters (Nos.

95-259,

95-779).

Respondent's noted that "The court has spumed attempts to divine of an earlier
Congress from legislative action taken by a later Congress." Id.
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Moreover, it focuses on the nature of the relationship between
employers and employees and not on the number of hours worked
each day. For employers, the inquiry must stop with employees
who are physically present at work or on paid leave. Though
small businesses must be shielded from frivolous Title VII
claims, they cannot be protected at the expense of the employee.
If the Court adopts the counting method, employers may escape
from the prohibitions of Title VII by discriminating against
unsuspecting part-time workers who take a sick day or an unpaid
leave of absence.

III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ENDORSEMENT OF
THE PAYROLL METHOD

In January, 1997, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously overruled the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Metropolitan.134 In the opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the
Court stated that the relevant issue to be decided was whether,
for purposes of Title VII coverage, employees should be counted
according to the payroll method which focuses on the on-going
employment relationship with the employee rather than the
alternative counting method, which only counts employees who
are physically present in the workplace or on paid leave. 135
While the parties agreed that, for purposes of Title VII,
an employee is anyone who has an on-going employment
relationship with an employer, respondents reiterated their
position that the employment relationship is defined by
compensation. 136 Accordingly, an employee cannot be counted
134. Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997).

135. Id. at 662. Specifically. Metropolitan had more than 15 employees on
its payroll on each working day: however, for nine weeks it employed two
part-time hourly workers who ordinarily only worked four days a week. Id. at
663. Therefore, Metropolitan argued that they were exempt from the scrutiny
of Title VII because petitioner failed to meet the jurisdictional minimum
necessary to bring a Title VII discrimination action. Id.

136. Id.
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towards the jurisdictional minimum unless he or she is receiving
compensation for their labor. 137
The Court analyzed the differences between the two
methods endorsed by the parties and found that the correct
method of determining an on-going employment relationship is to
look at whether the employee appears on the employer's payroll
and not at whether the employee is being compensated on a
particular day. 138 Moreover, this method of counting employees
has been adopted by both the First and Fifth Circuits, numerous
district courts, by the EEOC, and by the Department of Labor for
purposes of the FMLA.
Next, the Court turned to the issue of interpreting the
statutory language of Title VII. The Supreme Court has often
insisted upon the structural reading of statutes: "Our normal
canons of construction caution us to read the statute as a whole,
and, unless there is good reason, to adopt a consistent
interpretation of a term used in more than one place within a
statute." 13 9 The Court found that, where there is no indication to
the contrary, structural interpretations of statutes "are assumed to
40
bear their 'ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.'" 1
The Court rejected the court of appeals' notion that if
Congress intended to adopt the payroll method, it would have
phrased the statute to require an employer "have fifteen or more
employee in each of the twenty or more calendar weeks" without
adding the additional phrase, "for each working day." 14 1 The
Court stated that "[wlithout that qualification, it would have been
unclear whether an employee who departed in the middle of a
calendar week would count toward the 15-day minimum for that
week; with the qualification he does not." 142 Therefore, by
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. United States v. Thomson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 512 n.5
(1992).

140. Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 660, 664
(1997) (quoting Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd.,
Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993)).
141. Id.

142. Id.
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looking at the ordinary meaning of the words in the statute as
well as the history and purpose of Title VII, it is clear that Title
VII was intended to be interpreted consistent with the payroll
method. 143
The Court conceded that when an employer is normally
asked how many employees he or she has, that employer would
give the number of employees who are physically present in the
workplace on that day. 144 However, the Court focused on the
need for consistency and ease in administering the goals and
policies of Title VII and concluded that these goals could not be
achieved by counting employees only on days that they are
45
physically present in the workplace. 1
The Court was not persuaded by respondent's argument
that interpreting the phrase "for each working day" in a manner
that is consistent with the payroll method would render the phrase
meaningless. 146 First, the Court determined that without an
expansive interpretation, it would be remain problematic whether
147
or not to count employees who leave work mid-week.
Second, commencing and leaving employment mid-week is more
common than the court of appeals acknowledged. 14 8 In the everchanging world of business, employers neither hire nor fire
employees on a Monday through Friday work week. 149
Moreover, the Supreme Court found that more and more
employer's payrolls work on an "end of the month rather than an
143. Id.
144. Id.

145. Id. Furthermore, employers rarely maintain daily attendance records
for salaried employees. Id. The Court believed that if it were to accept
Metropolitan's interpretation of Title VII, it would lead into an "incredibly
complex and expensive factual inquiry." Id. at 665.
146. Id.

147. Id. The Court noted that "[slimiliarly the adjective 'working' within
the phrase 'for each working day' eliminates any ambiguity about whether
employees who depart after the end of the workweek, but before the end of the
calendar week, count toward the 15-employee minimum for that week." Id. at
664-65.
For the Court, elimination of "mere ambiguity" was enough
justification for the adoption of this interpretation of the statute. Id. at 665.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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end of the week pay schedule." 150 If Metropolitan's argument
was to be accepted by this Court, there would continue to be
uncertainty in counting employees who are compensated for sick
days, vacation days, leaves of absence, or holidays.
The Supreme Court unanimously adopted the payroll
method of counting employees for Title VII jurisdiction.
Therefore, there will no longer be divergent methods of counting
employees because the Court has determined that the ultimate
touchstone of the determination is:
whether an employer has an employment relationship with 15 or
more employees for each working day in 20 or more weeks
during the year in question... [regardless of their nonappearance on a payroll] ... [A]II one needs to know about a

given employee for a given year is whether the employee started
or ended employment during that year, and if so, when. He is
counted as an employee for each working day after arrival and
before departure. 15 1
The Court concluded that in light of the new and
expansive interpretation of § 2000-e(b), Metropolitan was an
"employer" for purposes of Title VII jurisdiction and Darlene
Walters is entitled to bring her retaliatory-discharge claim against
it under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.152

CONCLUSION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a giant step
forward in the effort to eradicate the moral and economic
indignation and discrimination experienced by many Americans
in the workplace. The United States Supreme Court's adoption
of the payroll method finally creates uniformity among the lower
courts in defining who is an "employer" for purposes of Title
VII. The payroll method signals a victory for employees of small
150. Id.

151. Id. at 665-66.
152. Id. at 666.
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businesses by adequately providing a clearer path for the
assertion of Title VII discrimination claims against their
employers.
Moreover, by focusing on the nature of the
relationship between employers and employees, and not on the
number of hours worked each day, the goals and policies of Title
VII can be realized and enforced to their fullest potential.
Dina Mastellone
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